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BIDDING THEORY AND THE TREASURY BILL AUCTION: 
DOES PRICE DISCRIMINATION INCREASE BILL PRICES? * 
Vernon L. Smith 
I Introduction and Summary 
R ECENT DISCUSSIONS by Milton Fried- 
man [4] and Deane Carson [2] have in- 
dependently suggested that the Treasury should 
abandon the policy of price discrimination in 
the weekly auction of 91-day and 182-day 
Treasury bills. They would substitute a simu- 
lated purely competitive auction in which all 
bids are filled at a uniform market-clearing 
price determined by the intersection of the 
offer quantity and the demand array of sub- 
mitted bids. Andrew Brimmer [ 1, p. 181 ] chal- 
lenged this view, arguing in favor of price dis- 
crimination on the ground that efficient ". 
resource allocation should be subordinated to 
the minimization of interest cost to the Treas- 
ury. . . ." This conclusion requires the as- 
sumption, stated explicitly by Brimmer [1, p. 
178] that, "Through auctioning new bills (at 
discriminatory prices), the United States Treas- 
ury receives higher prices than it could get by 
selling these issues at a single price." 
This paper is not directed to the question of 
whether the Treasury should or should not 
practice in the public sector what the Clayton 
Act prohibits in the private sector. The paper 
is concerned exclusively with the theoretical 
question of whether the Treasury would neces- 
sarily receive higher prices by employing price 
discrimination than it could get by selling the 
issues at a single price. From a theory of bid- 
ding under uncertainty, which seems to apply 
naturally to the Treasury auction, it will be 
shown that buyers may be expected to enter 
lower bids under price discrimination than they 
would for a simulated competitive auction. If 
this analysis is accepted, it suggests that the 
Treasury may actually get less revenue from a 
given bill offering under price discrimination 
than under a competitive auction. 
Various approaches might be used in at- 
temDting to build a model of bidding behavior 
in the bill auction. My approach will assume 
that bidders desire to maximize expected util- 
ity, where the expectation is over a subjective 
probability density function for the lowest ac- 
cepted bid. That is, whether we are designing 
a discriminatory auction model or a purely 
competitive auction, each bidder is assumed to 
associate a subjective probability with each 
possible value for the minimum successful bid. 
Within this framework, three models will be 
discussed. Model I assumes each bidder has a 
fixed specified limit price at which he is willing 
to buy a specified quantity of bills. I intend 
this model to serve as an abstract representa- 
tion of the behavior of non-dealer participants 
in the bill auction -banks, corporations and 
insurance companies -who act more or less 
as final holders of the bills. It is assumed in 
Model II that each bidder attaches a subjective 
probability density to the price at which he can 
resell new bills bought at auction from the 
Treasury. I think of this model as applying to 
the government security dealers who partici- 
pate in the auction. Such dealers face not only 
the uncertainty, experienced by all bidders, as 
to where the low bid will fall, but also uncer- 
tainty as to the price that can be obtained by 
retailing the new bills in the secondary market 
for outstanding bills. In both Models I and II, 
the decision variable is the bid price. Model 
III is a generalization of II in which the deci- 
sion variables are the bid price and the quan- 
tity of bills to be specified in the bid. From 
Models I and II, it is possible to show, unam- 
biguously, that an individual will make at least 
as low a bid (and most probably lower) in a 
discriminatory auction as in a single-price com- 
petitive auction. From Model III, which seems 
to be less tractable, the case rests with an ex- 
ample in which an individual's bid price is less, 
and the quantity of bills specified in the bid is 
less, under discrimination. 
II Mechanics of the Bill Auction 
The weekly bill auction begins each Wednes- 
[ 141 ] 
* This paper was prepared while the author was a mem- 
ber of the Ford Foundation Faculty Research Seminar on 
Experimental Economics, Carnegie Institute of Technology, 
August 1964. 
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day when the Treasury releases an announce- 
ment, through the reserve banks, inviting 
tenders for specified amounts of 91-day and 
182-day issues. The weekly offering of 91-day 
issues amounts to around $1 billion, that of the 
longer issue about half a billion dollars. The 
resulting bids are normally tendered the fol- 
lowing Monday to each Reserve Bank by the 
bill investors in each Federal Reserve district. 
Delivery is made to the successful bidders on 
the following Thursday. Before 1947, all bids 
had to be entered at a specified price. Since 
1947, small investors have been accommodated 
by permitting the option of submitting non- 
competitive bids for limited amounts of bills 
($100,000 or less for 182-day bills, $200,000 
or less for 91-day bills). The successful com- 
petitive bids are filled at their individual bid 
prices, while the non-competitive bids are filled 
at a quantity weighted average of the accepted 
competitive bids. These "noncompetitive" bids 
perform, for the price discriminatory auction, 
a role analogous to the order "buy at market 
or better" used in the organized stock exchange 
auctions. That is, each of these institutional 
forms of bidding permits the buyer to be cer- 
tain of making a purchase, though at the cost 
of having to risk the payment of a higher price. 
Since the noncompetitive bids do not enter di- 
rectly into the determination of bill auction 
prices, this type of bid will not be analyzed in 
what follows. Clearly, if all bids were noncom- 
petitive, auction prices would be indeterminate. 
To illustrate price determination, suppose 
that the net offering of 91-day bills to the com- 
petitive bidders is Q0 in figure 1. Qo would be 
the total offering minus the amount of noncom- 
petitive bids. (This arithmetic makes clear 
how the noncompetitive bids exert an indirect 
influence on price determination.) The array 
of competitive bids from highest to lowest 
forms an effective demand, dd, for the offering. 
The lowest accepted bid would be at PL the 
highest at PH. 
In this illustration, the gross receipts from 
the offering are given by the area below dd and 
SS in figure 1. With respect to the effective de- 
mand curve, dd, the seller acts as a "perfect" 
price discriminator. By contrast, if this market 
were operated to simulate a purely competitive 
auction, and if we assume the same bids to have 
FIGuRE 1 
Price 
d 
Pa. 
S 
d 
Qo Quantity 
been submitted as in the example for price dis- 
crimination, the result would have been the 
uniform market-clearing price, PL, for all suc- 
cessful bidders. Under these assumptions, and 
this seems to be the accepted reasoning, the 
Treasury receives greater revenue from the 
offering as a consequence of practicing price 
discrimination. However, as will be demon- 
strated in later sections, it is not reasonable to 
suppose the bids will be the same under the two 
forms of auctions [3, pp. 391-392]. 
To illustrate, suppose each bidder, i, in the 
market, has a firm reservation price, Pi, that he 
is willing to pay for a unit or lot of the bills 
traded. Then the "potential" demand, or limit 
price set, is determined by the ordered set {Pi} 
arrayed in descending order from highest to 
lowest. Such a set is illustrated by DD in figure 
2, and corresponds to the demand curve of 
ordinary price theory. From the analysis below, 
however, when a buyer knows that a successful 
bid will be filled at his bid price, he will tend 
to bid lower than if he knows it will be filled at 
the marginal bid price of all buyers. If the 
limit price set is DD, which is the demand under 
a simulated competitive auction, then the ef- 
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FIGURE 2 
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fective demand, dd, under price discrimination 
might be as shown in figure 2. It follows that 
for a given DD, and a single auction, price dis- 
crimination might yield the Treasury more or 
less revenue than the proposed competitive 
auction. A seller gets less revenue under price 
discrimination if area A < area B in figure 2. 
Over time, with repeated bidding in successive 
weekly Treasury auctions, if DD and SS condi- 
tions were constant, it is clear that the unsuc- 
cessful bidders in earlier auctions would tend 
to raise their bids, while the successful bidders 
would tend to lower their bids. Consequently, 
area B would approach zero, as the lower part 
of dd rose toward DD. In the bill auction, 
however, both DD and SS change from one 
auction to another. Indeed, the change is some- 
times so great that the range of accepted bids 
for one week does not overlap the range for the 
following week [4]. Hence, the price uncer- 
tainties which lead one to expect dd to be below 
DD may persist indefinitely over time. 
III Model I: A Theory of Non-Dealer 
Bidding Behavior 
This section presents an elementary static 
expected utility maximization model of non- 
dealer bidding behavior in the two alternative 
kinds of auction markets. Based upon the re- 
source and opportunity situations faced by such 
a bidder, it is assumed that the individual has 
a fixed limit price above which he will not bid 
for a unit or lot of Treasury bills, in a specific 
auction. If P is the given limit price and p is 
his bid price to be determined, the individual's 
choices are assumed to be governed by a utility 
function for money, or "rent," U(P - p), if his 
bid is accepted, 0, if it is rejected. Since 
the purchase lot size is fixed in this model 
it can be set equal to unity without loss of gen- 
erality. Finally, we suppose that the individual 
would have a subjective density function, f(x), 
for the minimum successful bid, x, if he were 
bidding in a discrimination auction, and g(x), 
if he were bidding in the proposed single-price 
competitive auction. 
With these assumptions, in a discrimination 
auction a von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected 
utility maximizer should choose his bid, p, so as 
to maximize: 
p 
ED(U) U(P-p)f(x)dx, 0 x -P. 
0 
A maximum occurs at pO on this interval if: 
DED 
= U(P - pO)f(p?) - U'(P - pO)F(pO) 
ap 
X> ?, PO = P 
{ = Op0 = p* (interior solution) (1) 
For an interior maximum at p*, one must also 
have 
D2ED U(P p*)f'(p*) - 2U'(P- p*)f(p*) 
+ U"(P - p*)F(p*) < 0. (2) 
The inequality in (2) can be taken as a postu- 
late, or if we assume diminishing marginal 
utility, U" < 0, and a unimodal density, f(p), 
then the inequality necessarily holds for solu- 
tions p* above the mode, since in that region 
f' (p) < 0. Figure 3 illustrates an interior solu- 
tion at D (discrimination). 
In a competitive auction, by contrast, since 
all bids are filled at the uniform market clear- 
ing price, x, expected utility to an individual 
entering a single bid is: 
p 
EC(U) f2 U(P -x)g(x)dx, 0O p ?P. 
0 
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FIGURE 3 
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x~~~~~~ 
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rP p 
For a maximum of E0(U) at p?, 
DEC = U0(P-p?)g(p?) { > OP? = p 
U(P 
=~ _IO= * 
(3) 
But, if U(P - p) > 0, and g(p) > 0 on 0 p 
P, the equality condition can never be satis- 
fied. Therefore, as is intuitively obvious, in 
competitive auctions the expected utility max- 
imizer will bid his full limit price, P. There is 
no penalty for winning the bid at a quotation 
above the market clearing price so the bidding 
problem reduces to one of maximizing the 
chance of success. This is accomplished by bid- 
ding the maximum price P, as illustrated in 
figure 3 at point C (competition). 
The conclusion is that a non-dealer would 
never bid higher under discrimination than un- 
der competition, and given the variety of U's 
and f(x)'s likely to be encountered in real bid- 
ders, we should expect a tendency toward solu- 
tions p0 = p* < P under discrimination. 
The model can be extended to include the 
case where an individual desires to enter bids 
for several lots of bills, and has limit prices 
P1 < P2 < P3 < . . . for each lot. 
IV Model II: A Theory of Dealer 
Bidding Behavior 
The distinguishing feature of dealer opera- 
tions in the bill auction is that they acquire 
new bills for resale in the secondary market. 
Their livelihood depends upon an ability to re- 
sell such bills, on the average, at more favor- 
able terms than they acquire them. Their prof- 
its are squeezed from below by uncertainty as 
to how high the range of accepted bids will be, 
and from above by uncertainty as to how low 
the price at which they turn the bills in the 
secondary market will be. 
For a given lot of bills, we again assume a 
utility function U(P - p) if the bid at price p is 
accepted, 0, otherwise, with subjective den- 
sities f(x) and g(x), respectively, for the low- 
est accepted bid in the discriminatory and 
competitive auctions. In addition, for the deal- 
ers, we assume a subjective probability density 
h(P) for the price P at which the bills may be 
peddled in the secondary market. The density 
h (P) is assumed to be the same regardless of 
the type of auction. 
In the discriminatory auction expected util- 
ity is now: 
x0 P 
ED(U) = ff U(P - p)f(x)h(P)dxdP. 
o 0 
Expected utility is maximum at p* if: 
DED f (p*)I (p*) + F(p*)I (p*) - 0 
A 
DP 
which can be written 
l (p(P*= (p* (P*) (4) 
and if: 
D2ED 2f (p*)I'(p*) + I(p*)f'(p*) 
A 
DP2 
+ F(p*)I"(p*) < 0, 
where 
I (p*) = U(P - p*)h (P)dP, I'(p*) 
0 
= - f U'(P - p*)h (P)dP. 
0 
By substituting for I(p*) from (4), this last 
condition can be written: 
D2ED = I(P*) [ 2f(p*) F(p*)f (p*) 
DP2 f (P*) 
+ F(p*)I"(p*) < 0. (5) 
In a competitive auction, expected utility for 
the same dealer would be: 
EC(U) = f f U(P - x)g(x)h (P)dxdP. 
0 0 
A maximum at p** requires 
DE- g(p**)I(p**) = 0, or 
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I(p**) 0, if g(p**) > 0, (6) 
2 g(p**)I'(p**) < 0, or 
I'(p**) < 0, if g(p**) > 0. (7) 
Now, in figure 4 illustrating the solutions (4) 
FIGURE 4 
/ (P) - f (p) 
t/ <~~~ 
p p 
and (6) it is seen that p* < p**, since, from 
(7), I'(p) < O and therefore- F(P)r(p) > O 
in the neighborhood of p**. 
The conclusion is that a dealer submitting a 
single bid may bid lower in a discrimination 
auction than in the proposed competitive auc- 
tion. 
V Model mI: A Generalization of II 
The previous models assume that the quan- 
tity of bills to be taken by the individual bidder 
is fixed, with only the bid price a decision var- 
iable. Consider now the dealer case where both 
the price, p, and the quantity, Q, specified in 
the sealed bid are decision variables. It is as- 
sumed that the dealer will retail the entire 
quantity of bills at a price P, given by a sub- 
jective probability density function h(P). 
Proceeding as before, expected utility under 
the discriminatory organization of the market 
is: 
x0 P 
ED(U) = 4U (P-p)Q]f(X)k(P)dxdP. 
o 0 
Necessary conditions for a maximum of 
Es(U) at (p*,Q*) are: 
DED (p*) U[ (P - p*)Q*]k(P)dP 
ZP 0 (8) 
00 
- F(p*) f Q*U' [(P - p*)Q* ]k(P)dP = 0 
0 
7ED 
= 
F(p*) f (P p*)U 
aQ O 
(P - p*)Q* h(P)dP = 0. (9) 
Now suppose utility is quadratic in money. It 
is well-known that if the expected utility ax- 
ioms are satisfied, then any positive linear 
transformation of a utility function is also a 
utility function. Therefore, we do not lose any 
generality by working with a one-parameter 
quadratic utility U(m) = m -am2, where m is 
money. For this case (8) and (9) can be put in 
the form: 
Q* = 
p_ p*) _ F(p*) (p- P*) f (P*) 
a[V(P) + (p p*)2._ 2(P-p*) 
F (p*) 
(10) 
Q* 
= (1 
2 a[V(P) + (P _ p*)2] 
where P and V(P) are the mean variance of 
Pr 
the density h(P), and F(p*) = f (x)dx. By 
eliminating Q* between (10) and (11) we get 
the following implicit function in p*: 
(P-p*)V(P) + (p_ p*)3 
-2 V (P*) (P) = O, (12) 
with Q* given by either (10) or (11), once p* 
is determined from (12). 
In the numerical example below we consider 
the special case of (11) and (12) where the 
A 
density f(p) = e-3(P-P) a member of the 
I A 
gamma family. Then F(p) = - e3(P-p) and 
F(p) _ 1 
___= - Hence, (12) can be written as a 
f(P) 3 
cubic, which, if we make the substitution 
y = P- p* will be: 
3y3 + 3V(P)y - 2V(P) =0. (12a) 
In the competitive auction, expected utility 
would be: 
00 P 
E0(U) = u -(P -x)QI 
0 0 
g(x)k(P)dxdP 
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with necessary conditions for a maximum at 
(p**, Q**) given by: 
?E= g (P**J U [(P-p**)Q**] h(P)dP= O, 
(13) 
DE 
P** 
SDEa JffJe (P-x)U' 
A 
DQ o O 
[(P - x)Q**] g(x)h(P)dxdP = 0. 
(14) 
As above, let U(m) = m - am2. Then (13) 
and (14) can be written: 
Q**=- - , (15) 
a[V(P) + ( p**)2] 
p** 
(P - x)g(x)dx 
0 
Q**= p** g(x)dx. (16) 
2aS[V(P) + (P - X)2] 
0 
Where g(x) is the gamma density e -2 (P 
- x), then in (16) we have 
P** 
r _ A J (P - x)e -2(P-x)dx 
- 
= 14(P-P + 2)e-2 (P-P), 
and 
P** 
J [V(P) + (P - X)2] e -2(P-x)dx 
= 1/2 { [V(P) + P2] - P(p 
-1/2) + J/2 (p2-_p 
A 
+ l/2)}e-2(P-p). 
Then from (15) and (16), making the substi- 
tution z = P - p**, gives the cubic 
2Z3 + 3Z2 + [1 + V(P)]Z - V(P) = 0. (17) 
Now consider the following numerical coun- 
ter example to the hypothesis that the Treasury 
receives higher prices under price discrimina- 
tion, than if the bills were sold at purely com- 
petitive auction. Let the subjective density 
A 
h(P) = e -(P - p); also gamma. We note 
A 
that h(P), g(x), and f (p), have meansP - 1, 
P - 2, P - 3, and variances V(P) = 1, V(x) 
= 4, and V(p) = 9. These parameters are con- 
sistent with a presumption that traders would 
expect the lowest accepted bid p in a discrim- 
inatory auction to be below the lowest accepted 
bid x in a competitive auction, which in turn is 
expected to be below the price P at which the 
bills can be resold in the secondary market. 
Also note that in all three density functions 
A 
P is an upper bound on subjective bill prices. 
A 
We assume P = 100, i.e., no trader believes it 
possible that bill prices can exceed 100 either 
purchased at auction or at resale. No doubt it 
is unrealistic to suppose that the most likely 
A 
price is P = 100 in each case, but we make this 
compromise with realism in the interests of 
computational simplification. Our purpose is 
to provide a counterexample, and if there is 
one there are surely millions! 
From the numerical values P = 100, V(P) 
=1, P =P-1 = 99, the cubic (12a) be- 
comes 3y3 + 3y - 2 = 0 with the real positive 
root y* -- 0.52. Hence p* = P-y* - 98.48. 
If we assume a = 10', then substitut- 
ing the appropriate numbers into (11) gives 
Q*- 2000. Substituting the numbers into 
(17), gives the cubic: 
2z3 + 3Z2 + 2z - 1 = 0, 
with real positive root z** - 0.32. Hence 
p** = P -z** - 98.68, and from (15) Q** 
2900. 
Consequently, in this example, the dealer in 
a competitive auction bids 98.68, and desires 
to purchase 2,900 bills at that bid. In a dis- 
criminatory auction he would not only bid less 
(98.48) but also take fewer bills (2,000). 
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